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Book Reviews
CINM AND INSANTY. Edited by Richard W. Nice, Philosophical
Library, New York, 1958. 280 pp.
This is one of the best-if not the best-of the several symposia
on problems of forensic psychiatry that have appeared in recent years.
The treatment is not exhaustive but from a functional point of view
is geared to ultimate practical legislative solutions; the issues are well
selected, and the disciplines involved-law, psychiatry, psychology
and sociology-are ably represented. However, without apparent
reason, certain issues are treated exclusively by lawyers, while others
are completely preempted by representatives of the sister sciences of
the law. Thus, the now familiar issue of Durham versus the American
Law Institute's definitions of "insanity" as a defense in a criminal
case is covered by lawyers in a familiar way. To students of crim-
inal law, the names of the writers suggest the arguments advanced:
Judge Sobeloff (From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond), Profes-
sors Weihofen (In Favor of the Durham Rule) and Wechsler (The
American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model Penal
Code). One would wish to hear the psychiatric side at this time, when
the Durham rule has undergone some courtroom testing. Perhaps also
semantictists ought to be heard on Professor Weihofen's prnicipal-
notice, negative-apology of Durham, namely, that the alternative
suggested by the American Law Institute contains key words (such
as "substantial") which are rather indefinite. The question would
seem to be whether or not they add an element of relatively greater
definiteness to the test, absolute definiteness in legislative drafting
being a utopian goal.-
Less generally known are the contentions of the writers specifically
concerned with "irresistible impulse." The disciplines represented are
psychiatry and sociology, but not law. In a noteworthy contribution,
Dr. Davidson (Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility)
suggests a useful differentiation of impulse: "(a) Explosive reactions
in psychotic (insane) persons; (b) Obsessional compulsions in neu-
rotics (example: pyromania); (c) Rage reactions in persons with no
psychosis or psychoneurosis" (page 80). The author believes that
the first type presents no problem, for an act committed under the im-
pact of such impulse is clearly outside of the scope of criminality, since
1 This statement, of course, should not be taken to be a defense of the
Law Institute's tests.
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it is "unintentional in any meaningful sense."2 The problem of the
neurotic impulse, generally assumed to fall within the area of respon-
sibility on the fallacious theory that "a neurotic compulsion differs
only in degree from normal temptation," should-in the author's view
-be re-examined. For the protection of the individual himself and
of society, the arsonist or the exhibitionist must be either imprisoned
or committed, and Dr. Davidson apparently favors the former solu-
tion. But "rage reactions in otherwise normal people" cannot, in his
opinion, be handled as instances of irresponsibility. Of course, it
may be argued-and this is overlooked by the author-that in such
states there is perhaps less "intention" than in some of the instances
of psychotic persons, provided that the psychiatrist is prepared so
to testify.
Cressey (The Differential Association Theory and Compulsive
Crimes) deals with the question of whether so-called "compulsive
crimes" constitute an exception from the differential association
theory's hypothesis that "criminality is learned from observations of
definitions favorable to law violation," where such crimes result not
from former contacts with differential values concerning "law-abiding-
ness," but depend upon a non-social agent or process. The author notes
that generally crimes are characterized as "compulsive" when a motive
is lacking, but that "motives are circumscribed by the actor's learned
vocabulary" and that his identifications as, e.g., a "kleptomaniac" are
thus determined. This, of course, introduces the actor's self-evalu-
ation (as a kleptomaniac) as an element of criminality-an evaluation
that is not relevant under present law.
As in Cressey's article, a mainly methodological orientation again
appears in another sociological essay which attempts to cover the
broader area of crime generally. Bloch (Psychiatric and Sociological
Variations in the Interpretation of the Criminal Act) deals with the
complexity of the individual crime factors and the relatively of "free-
dom" a person may possess to refrain from crime in the light of the
variations of pressures. This phenomenon was discussed some time
ago by the German jurist Rheinhard Frank. Bloch's contribution lies
rather in his suggestions for combination of psychodynamic and sit-
uational factors in interpreting crime causation and for greater utiliza-
tion of sociological recearch in psychiatry.
Psychiatric problems arising beyond the area of defining insanity
are considered by Dr. Eaton in a provocative article (Functions of the
2 One could argue that no impulsive act is "intentional" in any "meaningful
sense," provided that meaning is adequately construed. But it may be assumed
that in the case of a psychotic defendant a psychiatrist would not hesitate to
testify to the absence of "intention," although-he may then think of "intention"
in a legal sense.
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Psychiatrists in the Court and Prison). The author's focus is on "treat-
ment' rather than on diagnosis. These issues are usually separated in
law. Perhaps due to this separation, the law often affords treatment
to the less treatable, e.g., the habitual offender, while denying it to
the more treatable, the occasional offender. The author suggests but
does not exhaust a problem which should be of greatest concern to
legislators: "If punishment sometimes keeps a person from repeating
an offense, then it is important to know what sort of person might
be influenced in this way and by what punishment." (page 169).
This suggestion would be more fruitful if the author also indicated
a method for securing an answer to this query, provided that such
answer is expected to be sufficiently general, so as to afford a basis
for legislative action. Dr. Eaton also raises a significant issue in the
law regarding unfitness to plead. Determination of such unfitness
deprives the accused of opportunity for acquittal, while subjecting
him to confinement when there may be no need for it for the protec-
tion of himself or of society. But whether such need exists may
often be determined only after knowledge whether he committed
the act of which he stands secured.
Other inadequacies of our present state of the law are pointed out
by Burke (New Light on the Eternal Conyict Between Law and
Medicine in judicial Practice) in an appeal for federal legislation to
govern all non-voluntary admissions to state institutions and gen-
erally for greater recognition of patients' rights as regards diagnostic
and therapeutic methods.
While Professor Winn (Principles of Punishment) reexamines the
old question of the justification of the state's right to punish, Dr. Finn
(Reflections on the Psychologist as Expert Witness) draws attention
to the often crudely punitive treatment of psychiatric patients in State
hospitals.
This symposium is an essential in libraries of "social scientists"
in the broadest sense of this term.
Helen Silving*
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